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1. Introduction: Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA and the state of the art of its 
implementation at national level. 
 
Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA applies the principles of mutual trust and mutual 
recognition to cross-border transfers of prisoners among the EU Member States .
1
 As is 
the case for many other EU acts concerning judicial cooperation in criminal matters, this 
instrument replaced the intergovernmental footprint of the pre-existing Convention of 
the Council of Europe on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons of 1983.2 In fact, the 
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for the purpose of their enforcement in the European Union. 
2
 See also its Additional Protocol of December 1997, which entered into force in 2000. A new Additional 
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Convention had received little attention across the EU and its limited application had 
proven to be unsatisfactory, mainly because of its lengthy and cumbersome procedures.3 
On the other hand, the advanced mechanism established by the Framework Decision 
obliterates the role of the political branch, as it is centred on the golden rule of EU 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters, namely the duty on the part of the receiving 
authority to recognise the foreign judgment and to execute the transfer request. 
Therefore, the Framework Decision minimises unnecessary formalities and reiterates 
two major recurring features of EU legislation in this domain: the abolition of the 
double criminality check in relation to a list of serious offences4 and the provision of an 
exhaustive list of optional grounds for denying recognition.5 
However, notwithstanding the initial ambitions,6 ten years after its adoption, this 
instrument is stuck at the level of a promising youngster showing auspicious potential 
for the years to come. Its practical application by the national judicial authorities is still 
below expectations,7 although it is slowly increasing on a yearly basis, at least in some 
Member States.8 The unexplored potential of transfer procedures has led to a very 
limited body of EU and national case law and has further fed the silence of legal 
scholars. As a consequence, most of the remarkable theoretical knots in this Framework 
Decision are still to be loosened. 
The poor state of the art is the outcome of several converging factors. Firstly, the 
implementation of the Framework Decision was belated in many Member States, most 
of which did not comply with the transposition deadline of December 2011.9  
Secondly, the wording of this act represents the result of 3 years of heated negotiations 
within the Council. The imminent entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty was actually the 
most effective boost to the achievement of an agreement, under pressure of the foreseen 
eradication of the third pillar, along with the intergovernmental nature of its legal 
sources.10 
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 J.-C. Froment, 'Les avatars de la Convention sur le transfèrement de détenus en Europe', in J. Ceré, ed., 
Panorama européen de la prison (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2002), p. 33. 
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 See Art. 7(1)(2) of Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA, which reflects corresponding provisions 
included in most of the EU secondary acts in this domain. 
5
 See Art. 9 of Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA. Art. 10 also allows for partial recognition and 
execution. In addition, Art. 11 provides for postponement of execution if the certificate is incomplete or 
does not correspond to the judgment. Another key departure from the previous intergovernmental regime 
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6
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and the Kingdom of Sweden with a view to adopting a Council Framework Decision on the European 
enforcement order and the transfer of sentenced persons between Member States of the European Union. 
The initiative relied heavily on mutual trust between the Member States to impose a "basic duty to take 
charge of sentenced persons for enforcement of a sentence or order" (recitals 4 and 5). 
7
 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 'Criminal Detention and Alternatives: Fundamental 
Rights Aspects in EU Cross-Border Transfers' (2016), also available online at 
https://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2016/criminal-detention-and-alternatives-fundamental-rights-aspects-
eu-cross-border (accessed 5 March 2019). 
8
 Europris, 'Framework Decision 909 - Reports', available at https://www.europris.org/topics/framework-
decision-909 (accessed 5 March 2019). 
9
 See infra, par. 3 and footnote 16. 
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 V. Mitsilegas, 'The Third wave of Third Pillar Law', European Law Review 34 (2009), pp. 523-60. 
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This final rush led to inevitable compromises affecting the internal coherence and 
conceptual accuracy of the act.11 For example, the Framework Decision states that 
transfer procedures should be directed to favour the sentenced person's social 
rehabilitation, but does not provide any guidance on the scope of this notion, the 
elusiveness of which blurs the purpose and content of the duties of cooperation 
incumbent upon the issuing and executing Member States. In fact, a closer look at the 
preparatory works to the Framework Decision and at the practice of some Member 
States12 unveils the de facto managerial ambitions underpinning this instrument, which 
offers to the national authorities additional forms of control over - and removal of - 
undesired EU citizens. 
Thirdly, Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA covers the criminal execution phase, 
which is one of the most delicate fields for judicial cooperation procedures. This domain 
is still nowadays perceived as a secret garden of the Member States, where the process 
of Europeanization of penal justice faces a solid barrier, delimiting exclusive national 
competences. The limited room for EU intervention entails the absence of 
harmonisation measures and a subsequent high degree of fragmentation of domestic 
legal orders. The wide variety of penitentiary benefits, alternatives to detention and 
related measures pursuing the goal of enhancing the inmate's chances of successful re-
socialisation after conviction is an illustrative example, which touches upon the core of 
the scope and rationale of transfer procedures.13 
It follows that, at this stage, several substantive and procedural hurdles block the full 
effectiveness of this Framework Decision, from both quantitative (number of transfers) 
and qualitative (genuine attempt to pursue social rehabilitation goals) perspectives.  
The combination of elusive notions of EU law, opposing teleological priorities and legal 
fragmentation represents a favourable breeding ground for the many facets of the dark 
side of mutual trust: mutual distrust, mutual mistrust, or even just a lack of confidence 
in the feasibility and usefulness of judicial cooperation procedures. 
In this scenario, the varied practice of the national judicial and governmental authorities 
is clearly a key factor, as it can amplify or neutralise the above outlined concerns. In 
fact, beyond mere effectiveness-oriented arguments, a closer look at the practice of the 
Member States provides illustrative insights on how judicial cooperation mechanisms 
are perceived by the authorities concerned and on the degree of consistency between 
expected EU patterns and law in action at domestic level.  
More specifically, Italy represents a promising test-bed for an assessment of the 
advances and shortcomings of transfer procedures, on two main grounds. Firstly, the 
rate of inmates who are foreign EU nationals is considerably high. This basically entails 
remarkable (quantitative) opportunities for resorting to transfer mechanisms. Secondly, 
in the aftermath of the adoption of the Framework Decision, the Italian penitentiary 
system faced serious turbulence, mainly due to widespread overcrowding and critical 
deficiencies concerning detention conditions. The so-called prison emergency was 
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certified by the European Court of Human Rights in the Torreggiani pilot judgment,14 
where the Strasbourg Court urged Italy to take action to solve this structural situation. 
Such a contingency significantly influenced the Italian approach to the transfer of 
prisoners and led Italy to develop advanced strategies for enhancing the application of 
Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA. 
Building on this broader scenario, this article focuses on the state of the art of cross-
border transfers of prisoners in the Italian legal order. The analysis reflects the interim 
outcomes of a study carried out in the framework of the EU-funded research project 
RePers - Mutual Trust and Social Rehabilitation into Practice, which considers the 
application of Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA in Italy, Romania and Spain. 
In this context, the next section provides an overview of the main features of the 
research carried out in the context of the RePers project. These clarifications establish 
the necessary background to approach, on a more informed basis, the case study on 
Italy. In fact, paragraph 3 addresses the state of the art of the implementation of 
Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA in this Member State, providing a varied set of 
relevant statistics and pointing out the key role played by the bilateral relationship with 
Romania. The fourth paragraph focuses on some of the most debated procedural and 
substantive issues regarding the EU regime for the transfer of prisoners, which are 
considered through the lens of the Italian experience.  
More specifically, the study firstly considers the divide between the declared rationale 
of the Framework Decision and its actual drivers and how the Italian authorities cope 
with it. Secondly, the study addresses the debated topic of the protection of fundamental 
rights in the context of judicial cooperation procedures, as a key factor for the overall 
coherence of EU law and policies in this domain. Lastly, the article analyses the 
domestic reaction to the complex interconnection between the criminal execution phases 
of the issuing and executing Member States, in light of the wording of the EU act in 
question and of the interpretative clarifications offered by the recent case law of the 
Court of Justice. 
 
 
2. The research carried out in the framework of the RePers project 
The following paragraphs present the preliminary outcomes of the research activity 
conducted in the context of the above mentioned EU-funded project RePers – Mutual 
Trust and Social Rehabilitation into Practice. Before considering the substantive issues 
related to the implementation of Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA in Italy, it is worth 
briefly introducing the main features of the project and the activity conducted by the 
research units.15 
The RePers project mainly focuses on the institutional layer, rather than on the 
(potential) transferee’s perspective. The project activities aim to foster the improvement 
of transfer procedures in terms of both their effectiveness and their compliance with 
fundamental rights standards and social rehabilitation goals. 
Following a preliminary desk review phase of existing studies and literature, the 
consortium combined various research methodologies and tools. 
Firstly, each unit disseminated an online survey on Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA. 
The survey was sent to selected categories of recipients, namely members of the 
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 Torreggiani and Others v Italy, App. no 43517/09 et al. (ECHR, 8 January 2013). 
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 The research was developed by the University of Turin, the University of A Coruña, the Romanian 
Center for European Policies, the associations Amapola and Liderjust.  
5 
 
judiciary, ministerial officers, prison administration staff, lawyers and academics. At the 
time of writing this draft paper, about one hundred replies have been collected from the 
three Member States involved. The survey is intended to outline a general picture of the 
degree of knowledge and awareness of the main features of the Framework Decision, as 
well as to trigger reactions on personal perceptions and views as to the main hurdles to 
its implementation.  
Secondly, the interim outcomes of this activity were used to perform ad hoc interviews 
with key stakeholders from the national judiciary and the Ministries of Justice, with a 
view to deepening some of the issues broadly raised by the participants in the survey. 
This activity was supported by quantitative research on the overall number of transfers 
involving Italy, Romania and Spain in their capacity as issuing or executing States. 
Official statistics were collected and analysed, thanks to the invaluable cooperation of 
the Ministries of Justice of the Member States concerned. 
The third step of the research entailed both qualitative research of the data collected and 
a more in-depth analysis of specific files. In particular, the Romanian Ministry of Justice 
allowed access to specific landmark cases, which are illustrative of the main trends in 
Romanian practice. 
The Italian Ministry of Justice, which is party to the project consortium, authorised the 
research unit of the University of Turin and Amapola to analyse the folders concerning 
pending and concluded transfer procedures. This activity is still ongoing. At the time of 
writing this article, 362 files have been considered, covering most of the transfers 
processed in 2016 and 2017 by the competent ministerial department. While performing 
this analysis, specific attention was paid to a series of key factors, namely: the actual 
role of social rehabilitation concerns, the prisoners’ consent/opinion and the way it is 
expressed and collected, the exchanges of information between the issuing and 
executing authorities, the role of the lawyer (if any), the length of the transfer procedure 
and its link with the sentence remaining to be served, the outcome of the transfer 
procedure. 
This remarkable body of information ignited the fourth and final phase of the research, 
which is still ongoing. The consortium is performing a more in-depth qualitative 
analysis of the information collected during the previous phases of the project, and is 
conducting a series of mutual learning meetings involving selected experts and 
practitioners from Italy, Romania and Spain. Initially, these meetings are aimed at 
allowing the national authorities to share their concerns and views on the shortcomings 
of cross-border transfers. At a later stage, they will be more specifically aimed at 
reaching an agreement on best practices and shared solutions, which could also be 
beneficial for other Member States in the long run. 
 
 
3. Italy and Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA: Facts and Figures 
In its 2014 report on the state of the art of the implementation of Framework Decision 
2008/909/JHA at domestic level, the European Commission depicted a desolating - 
although quite common in the Third Pillar era - scenario, where only Denmark, Finland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, and the United Kingdom had complied with the transposition 
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deadline of 5 December 2011. The Commission also identified thirteen cases of belated 
implementation, while ten Member States had failed to adopt any relevant measure.
16
 
The report listed some recurring flaws in national transposition laws, such as the 
expansion of the conditions for the adaptation of the sentence, the introduction of new 
grounds for refusal and the lack of deadlines for national courts to decide on the appeals 
against the transfer decision. This is nothing new from the perspective of the multilevel 
normative cycle of judicial cooperation in criminal matters, in actual fact. 
However, from an Italian perspective, the Commission's assessment represented a 
unicum, since the Commission manifested its satisfaction with Italy's timely and high 
quality implementation and used it as an example for the other Member States. In fact, 
Italy had managed to implement the Framework Decision through legislative decree no. 
161 of 7 September 2010, which had been adopted on the basis of the law of delegation 
from the Parliament to the Government no. 88 of 7 July 2009. This means that the 
complex transposition process had been launched in the aftermath of the entry into force 
of the Framework Decision. Moreover, the wording of the domestic law had been 
carefully tailored to the text of the EU act in question, so that no actual departures from 
it can be detected.
17
 
For any insider of the Italian scenario, this performance
18
 and the award of the prize for 
best player in the game was – so to speak – surprising, especially in the context of those 
years.
19
 The whys and wherefores of this unique virtuous (formal) compliance were 
compelling questions which commentators should have taken more seriously. A clear 
answer to these underlying questions can be found in some of the many circular letters 
issued by the Italian Ministry of Justice to clarify the scope of the law of 
implementation and to address some of the challenges arising from its initial years of 
application. In particular, in a document of 18 April 2018, the Department of 
Penitentiary Administration urged the competent authorities – namely the public 
prosecutors at both first instance court and court of appeal levels – to prioritise transfers 
of prisoners to their Member States of origin. Furthermore, on 28 April 2014, another 
circular letter issued by the Department of Justice Affairs openly framed transfer 
procedures within the articulated set of measures enacted by the Italian Government to 
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 European Commission, Report on the implementation by the Member States of Framework Decisions 
2008/909/JHA, 2008/947/JHA and 2009/829/JHA on the mutual recognition of judicial decisions on 
custodial sentences or measures involving deprivation of liberty, on probation decisions and alternative 
sanctions and on supervision measures as an alternative to provisional detention, 5 February 2014, 
COM(2014) 57 final. This state of the art has gradually improved over time: today only Bulgaria still 
needs to implement this EU instrument. 
17
 V. Ferraris, 'L'implementazione del d.lgs. 161/2010 sul riconoscimento delle sentenze di condanna a 
pena detentiva: un caso di doppio fallimento', Legislazione penale (2019), available at 
www.lalegislazionepenale.eu. 
18
 Studies on the EU policy cycle point to the performance of the Member States to describe the formal 
and informal strategies and tools to comply with EU law and the outcomes thereof. M. Scholten, 'Mind 
the trend! Enforcement of EU law has been moving to Brussels', Journal of European Public Policy 24 
(2017), pp. 1348-66. 
19
 Italy has traditionally been one of the worst performers in terms of its level of compliance with EU law, 
particularly with regard to the transposition of Directives and Framework Decisions. L. Conant, 
'Compliance and What EU Member States Make of It', in M. Cremona, ed., Compliance and the 
Enforcement of EU Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 1. The situation has significantly 
improved in recent years, thanks to several institutional arrangements, such as the establishment of a unit 
within the structure of the Ministry for European Affairs specifically in charge of securing timely and 
proper implementation of these EU acts.  
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cope with the emergency of prison overcrowding, in the aftermath of the above 
mentioned judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in Torreggiani. The 
Ministry of Justice stressed the need for a more effective use of this mechanism to re-
distribute foreign inmates detained in Italy among the “sending” States. Whereas 
circular letters represent mere soft-law instruments, which usually list guidelines and 
disseminate useful information and best practices among the relevant stakeholders, 
these documents provide an illustrative overview of the actual aims underpinning the 
Italian performance, as they repeatedly refer to the need to reduce the pressure on the 
domestic prison system. 
Another key feature of the Italian implementation of Framework Decision 
2008/909/JHA and of the ensuing intense regulatory activity of the Italian Ministry of 
Justice is the constant focus on the bilateral relationship with Romania.  
At the time of transposition, Italy submitted a declaration pursuant to Art. 26(4) of the 
Framework Decision, which allows the Member States to conclude bilateral or 
multilateral agreements or arrangements on the subject matter, provided that they 
expand the scope of transfer procedures or facilitate judicial cooperation and the 
enforcement of foreign sentences. The Italian Government accordingly notified the 
Council of its intention to apply a pre-existing ad hoc bilateral agreement with 
Romania, dating back to 2003.
20
 Interestingly enough, Romania did not make a similar 
notification in 2013, when adopting the domestic transposition law, although it 
submitted several declarations concerning various aspects of the Framework Decision.
21
 
This is why the authorities of the two Member States concerned decided to negotiate a 
new agreement, which was eventually signed on 29 April 2015, aimed at sharing 
solutions to practical procedural challenges. This document is now described as a 
memorandum of understanding. Surprisingly, although this document is now the main 
reference point for managing transfers between these two Member States, neither 
Romania nor Italy has ever notified it to the Commission or to the Council. Moreover, 
the text of the arrangement is not public and its actual legal value is blurred, at least in 
the perception of the key operators, who describe it as a soft flanking measure to the 
laws of implementation of Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA, but de facto feel bound 
by its content. In addition, the conclusion of this memorandum has no legal basis in the 
Framework Decision and raises several concerns on the actual level of mutual trust 
between the national authorities involved, compared to the depiction given by the Court 
of Justice.
22
 
In addition, Romania is a primary and recurring concern in all ministerial circular 
letters, to the extent that some of them are specifically and solely devoted to issues 
related to transfers to and – less commonly – from Romania.23 This centre of gravity can 
be easily explained by statistics. In fact, Romanians constitute, on a stable basis over the 
years, the overarching majority of the foreign EU prison population in Italy. The 
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 The agreement was signed in Rome on 13 September 2003 and later ratified by Italy by means of law 
no. 281 of 30 December 2005. 
21
 The declarations are available on the website of the European Judicial Network: https://www.ejn-
crimjust.europa.eu/ejn/libcategories.aspx?Id=36 (accessed on 19 March 2019). 
22
 The Court has repeatedly stated that the domestic judicial authorities should trust each other regardless 
of the fact that the specific features of the legal order of another Member State may see the same case 
have a different outcome. See ECJ, joined cases C-187/01 and C-385/01, Gözütok and Brügge. Instead, 
this memorandum suggests that trust needs to be agreed, or at least favoured through a prior agreement. 
23
 See, for instance, the circular letter of 19 September 2016, which is entirely devoted to the many 
hurdles concerning the bilateral relationship with the Romanian authorities. 
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following chart shows the numbers of EU national inmates and reveals a significant gap 
between the Romanian community and groups of other nationalities. According to the 
latest available data, there are 2,531 Romanian inmates representing 76.6% of the 
overall prison population originating from other EU Member States. As far as other 
Union nationalities are concerned, the second and third places are taken by Bulgaria
24
 
and Poland, with 145 and 140 inmates, respectively. The different magnitude is 
undoubtedly remarkable. 
 
Chart no. 1 – Number of foreign EU inmates detained in Italy 
Nationality Accused Convicted Total 
% of foreign EU 
inmates 
Austria 3 2 5 0.2% 
Belgium 4 17 21 0.6% 
Bulgaria 55 90 145 4.4% 
Czech Republic 5 8 13 0.4% 
Croatia 25 69 95 2.9% 
Estonia 1 0 1 0% 
Finland 0 1 1 0% 
France 27 52 79 2.4% 
Germany 19 28 47 1.4% 
United Kingdom 5 9 14 0.4% 
Greece 6 15 21 0.6% 
Latvia 15 5 20 0.6% 
Lithuania 8 29 37 1.1% 
Malta 2 0 2 0.1% 
The Netherlands 7 5 12 0.4% 
Poland 51 89 140 4.3% 
Portugal 5 9 14 0.4% 
Romania 763 1,768 2,531 76.6% 
Slovak Republic 6 12 18 0.5% 
Slovenia 10 19 29 0.9% 
Spain 23 18 41 1.2% 
Sweden 2 0 2 0.1% 
Hungary 3 13 16 0.5% 
Total 1,045 2,258 3,303 100.0% 
 
* Data referring to the latest update of 28 February 2019. The Member States which are not listed in the chart have no 
prisoners detained in Italy. 
Source: The original collection listed all foreign inmates, including both EU and third country nationals. The research 
consortium extracted the data referring to Union prisoners and updated the percentages accordingly.  
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 However, it must be recalled that Bulgaria has not yet transposed Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA 
into its national legal system. 
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It follows that, while striving to maximise the application of Framework Decision 
2008/909/JHA, regardless of the aim underpinning these efforts, Romania constitutes a 
key interlocutor for the Italian authorities, deserving specific attention and dedicated 
procedures. This priority position is clearly reflected by the data on the number of 
transfers handled by Italy on a yearly basis. In this respect, chart no. 2 covers 2014 
onwards and shows the number of procedures launched by Italy as an issuing Member 
State. The predominance of Romanian cases is striking and reaches the peak of about 
85% of the new files in 2014. 
 
Chart no. 2 – New procedures under Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA 
  2014 2015 2016 2017 2018* 
New cases 498 318 393 324 150 
Of which 
Romania 424 217 243 216 109 
Other Member States 74 101 150 108 41 
 
* Data referring to the first 6 months of 2018  
Source: RePers project consortium. Elaboration of data provided by the Italian Ministry of Justice, General Affairs 
Department, International Cooperation Office  
 
The flows of actual transfers are also illustrative, as they confirm Romania steadily at 
the top of the chart of the receiving countries, during the whole relevant period. 
 
Chart no. 3 – Surrenders to other Member States under Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA 
Member States 2014 2015 2016 2017 1st half 2018 Total 
Romania 42 100 89 67 26 324 
Spain 0 9 19 14 7 49 
France 1 3 2 5 0 11 
The Netherlands 0 1 1 6 3 11 
Belgium 2 3 3 0 0 8 
Germany 0 0 0 2 4 6 
Slovenia 2 1 2 1 0 6 
United Kingdom 1 1 0 1 2 5 
Greece 0 0 1 3 1 5 
Poland 0 2 0 2 0 4 
Hungary 0 0 0 1 3 4 
Croatia 0 0 2 1 0 3 
Portugal 0 0 0 2 1 3 
Latvia 0 1 1 0 0 2 
Luxembourg 0 0 1 0 1 2 
Austria 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Slovak Republic 0 0 0 1 0 1 
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Sweden 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Lithuania* 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Czech Republic * 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 48 121 121 107 49 446 
 
* Zero means that one or more procedures were conducted, but did not lead to an actual transfer. 
Source: RePers project consortium. Elaboration of data provided by the Italian Ministry of Justice, General Affairs 
Department, International Cooperation Office. 
 
Crucially, from an Italian perspective, the main substantive and procedural challenges 
regarding cross-border transfers are closely connected to the stream of cases with 
Romania. The research developed so far provides solid evidence of the fact that the 
main efforts deployed by Italian judicial and governmental authorities address this 
Member State, also due to the significant number of pending cases. In fact, the statistics 
highlight increasingly robust reliance on this mechanism by the Italian judicial 
authorities, which is ultimately leading to an expanding backlog.  
 
Chart no. 4: closed and pending cases from 2014 to 2017 
 
  2014 2015 2016 2017 
A Pending cases at the beginning of the year n/a 397 594 793 
C Transfers 48 121 121 107 
D Recognition rejected + sentence served 53 n/a 73 2 
E Pending cases at the end of the year 397 594 793 1,008 
 
* Source: RePers project consortium. Elaboration of data provided by the Italian Ministry of Justice, General Affairs 
Department, International Cooperation Office. 
 
When studying these data in greater detail, evidence from Italy shows that the state of 
the art varies greatly depending on the public prosecution office concerned. The 
available data shows that the largest part of cross-border transfers is handled by a 
handful of offices, namely the biggest ones in size and territorial jurisdiction. 
Interestingly, they are all characterised by either the presence of a team of prosecutors 
tasked with international judicial cooperation or the identification of specialised 
delegates providing support to other colleagues.
25
  
 
Chart no. 5 – Italian Public Prosecution Offices involved in at least 10 surrenders. 
Prosecution Office Cases 
closed 
Cases 
pending 
Missing information Total 
Rome 73 105 6 184 
Milan 61 97 7 165 
Turin 39 56 3 98 
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 In some cases - in particular in the biggest Prosecution Offices such as Rome and Milan - the handling 
of a case of international judicial cooperation entails a corresponding decrease in the 'ordinary' workload 
of new or pending domestic cases for the magistrate involved. 
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Genoa 14 45 3 62 
Civitavecchia 25 18 3 46 
Padua 14 30 2 46 
Naples 18 22 3 43 
Brescia 15 23 2 40 
Florence 10 28 2 40 
Venice 12 25 2 39 
Bologna 13 16 1 30 
Ancona 14 13 2 29 
 
* Source: RePers project consortium. Elaboration of data provided by the Italian Ministry of Justice, General Affairs 
Department, International Cooperation Office. 
 
The outlined scenario provides solid evidence that Italy is an important test-bed for 
assessing the actual functioning, strengths and shortcomings of transfer procedures 
under Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA. Due to the remarkable number of transfers 
and of pending cases, although many involving Romania and a few other Member 
States, the Italian authorities have been confronted with the numerous hurdles connected 
to the application of this instrument. Therefore, the analysis will now move on to 
consider the Italian legal system's reaction to three of these major challenges, namely 
compliance with the formal objective of the Framework Decision, the possibility of 
blocking a transfer on the grounds of a tangible risk of violation of fundamental rights, 
and the cross-border coordination of domestic rules governing the enforcement of a 
sentence.
26
  
 
 
4. Cross-border enforcement of sentences under Framework Decision 
2008/909/JHA: The Italian view to European challenges. 
 
4.1. Questioning the rationale underpinning Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA: The 
hurdles to pursuing prisoners' social rehabilitation  
The active involvement of the offender in a progressive pathway towards a fruitful post-
execution reinsertion in his/her social environment is one of the traditional components 
of criminal punishment at domestic level. In a cross-border scenario, the identification 
of the best place for serving a sentence is a fortiori a key aspect for tailoring the 
punishment to the individual.
27
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 It is not possible to address here several other issues which have been analysed during the project 
activities and which pose daily obstacles to cross-border judicial cooperation in this domain, such as the 
overlap between transfers and the European Arrest Warrant, the translation of the certificate and the 
judgment, the determination of the sentence remaining to be served, in the light of factors such as 
accumulation of penalties and continuation of crimes.  
27
 For an account of the relevance of the notion of offenders' rehabilitation in the EU criminal judicial 
space see S. Montaldo, 'Offenders' Rehabilitation: Towards a New Paradigm for EU Criminal Law?', 
European Criminal Law Review 8 (2018), pp. 223-43. The aim of social rehabilitation also underpins 
other EU acts on judicial cooperation in criminal matters, such as Framework Decision 2008/675/JHA of 
24 July 2008 on taking account of convictions in the Member States of the European Union in the course 
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As recalled above, Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA accordingly states that cross-
border transfers should be intended to foster prisoners' chances of social rehabilitation.
28
 
However, despite and beyond the wording of this act, the formal link it establishes 
between offenders' rehabilitation and the prisoners' transfer has been labelled as a 
façade veiling the managerial ambitions of the Member State over intra-EU mobility.
29
 
The national governments' will to add prisoners' transfers to the list of EU instruments 
imposing on other Member States – and in particular on those of origin – the 
responsibility for unwanted migrants repeatedly arose during the negotiations of the act 
and recent researches demonstrate that it still represents a shadow purpose of transfer 
procedures.
30
  
To a certain extent, from a broader perspective, this approach seems to reflect a more 
general trend – criticised by some legal scholars – towards the fragmentation of Union 
citizenship into bits and pieces, where a descending scale of guarantees (often coupled 
by an ascending scale of duties) is tailored to less attractive categories of citizens.
31
 In 
this vein, it has been highlighted that the Member States are interested in reducing 
prison populations, along with costs related to the detention of foreigners and their 
involvement in social rehabilitation programmes.
32
  
This cost-saving choice is actually reflected at some points by the Framework Decision, 
which prioritises the effectiveness, the rapidity and the trend towards automaticity of the 
judicial cooperation mechanism, even to the detriment of a truly individualised 
assessment of the inmate's situation.  
Firstly, Art. 6 lifts the traditional compulsory criterion of the prisoner's consent in the 
case of a transfer to the Member State of nationality in which the inmate habitually lives 
or to which he/she will be deported after serving the sentence or has fled or returned 
before the conclusion of the proceedings pending against him/her or following the 
conviction in the issuing State. This normative choice marks a departure from the 
principle of individualisation of punishment and offers leeway to judicial and 
ministerial authorities to presume that the transfer will be beneficial to the inmate, even 
if it is contrary to his/her will. However, as it has been widely discussed in legal and 
criminological studies, tailoring punishment to the individual is a key trigger for social 
rehabilitation.
33
 This entails the difficult assessment of several and multi-faceted 
personal, institutional, social and legal converging factors, the importance of which is 
                                                                                                                                                                          
of new criminal proceedings. See, in this respect, A. Rosanò, 'Beshkov or the Long Road to the Principle 
of Social Rehabilitation of Offenders', European Papers 3 (2018), p. 433-44. 
28
 See supra, para. 1, as well as recitals 8 and 9 and Art. 3(1), of the Framework Decision.  
29
 See for instance V. Mitsilegas, EU Criminal Law after Lisbon. Rights, Trust and Transformation 
(Oxford: Hart, 2016), p. 222.  
30
 See in particular the outcomes of the research project STEPS2 Resettlement: R. Canton, N. Flynn and J. 
Woods, 'Social Rehabilitation Through the Prison Gate', available at http://steps2.europris.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/07/Annex-4.12.-Workstream-3-Social-Rehabilitation-Through-the-Prison-Gate.pdf 
(accessed 7 March 2019). 
31
 Inter alia, N.N. Shuibhne, 'Limits Rising, Duties Ascending. The Changing Landscape of Union 
Citizenship', Common Market Law Review 52, 2015, pp. 889-938. 
32
 M. Pleić, 'Challenges in Cross-border Transfer of Prisoners: EU Framework and Croatian Perspective', 
in D. Duić and T. Petrašević, eds., EU Law in Context. Adjustment to Membership and Challenges of the 
Enlargement (Osijek: University Josip Juraj Strossmayer, 2018), p. 380. 
33
 E. Melissaris, 'Theories of Crime and Punishment', in M.D Dubber and T. Hörnle, eds., The Oxford 
Handbook of Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 355. 
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further exacerbated by the cross-border dimension of transfers.
34
 In fact, as has been 
correctly pointed out, serving a sentence in the prisoner's State of origin does not 
amount to an automatic and non-rebuttable presumption of increased chances of 
achieving the re-socialising goal of criminal punishment.
35
 
Secondly, the sentenced person has the right to express his/her opinion regarding the 
transfer, and the authority of the issuing State must take this into account when deciding 
whether or not to transfer him/her. However, a negative opinion does not constitute 
grounds for rejecting recognition, and the Framework Decision does not attach clear 
consequences to it. Bearing in mind the hidden purposes of the transfer procedures, this 
soft version of the right to be heard does not impose any substantial limit to the issuing 
authority's discretion. 
Thirdly, from a complementary perspective, the prisoner's opinion is in any event 
deprived of substance, since the Framework Decision does not provide for any 
obligation on the part of the domestic authorities to inform the person concerned. As 
confirmed by some studies,
36
 a transfer - or even just an opinion about the possibility of 
being transferred - is a leap in the dark as to the detention conditions in the State where 
the inmate will serve the sentence, the details concerning the specific detention facility 
of destination and the situation thereof. The same applies to the rules governing the 
execution phase abroad, particularly in relation to the precise scope of reductions and 
remissions in sentences and other measures intended to favour offenders' rehabilitation. 
It is no coincidence that, in its 2014 report, the Commission pointed out a generalised 
lack of information for the sentenced person, affecting the possibility of providing a 
reliable personal opinion.
37
 
The RePers project activities confirm that the Italian practice on Framework Decision 
2008/909/JHA is not immune from these criticalities, even though various 
improvements are being promoted. Three main aspects are particularly illustrative in 
this regard and blur the actual purposes underpinning the instrument at issue. 
First of all, as referred to above, at least in the early years of application of the newly 
established regime of cross-border transfers, the intense regulatory activity of the 
Ministry of Justice urged national judicial authorities to resort to this Framework 
Decision to deflate prison overcrowding. This scenario represented the breeding ground 
for the development of policies and strategies to increase the number of transfers to 
some key Member States, with Romania on the frontline.  
To provide an example, as from 2015, under the pressure of the emergency certified by 
the aforementioned Torreggiani judgment, the Ministry of Justice launched regular 
screenings of the prison population, with a view to identifying potential transferees. The 
prison administration was asked to disseminate a form among the detainees, to inform 
them of the possibility of being transferred and to gather their opinion.  
The problem with this initiative - which is still ongoing on a yearly basis - is twofold. 
On the one hand, many interviews belie a generalised lack of knowledge and awareness 
                                                          
34
 I. Durnescu, E. Montero and L.Ravagnani, 'Prisoner transfer and the importance of the release effect', in 
Criminology and Criminal Justice 17, 2017, p. 450. 
35
 G. Vermeulen, et al., Cross-border execution off judgments involving deprivation of liberty, cit., p. 55. 
36
 See I. Durnescu, et al., 'Obstacles and Solutions in the implementation of the FD 2008/909/JHA', report 
of the STEPS2 Resettlement project, 2016, available at http://steps2.europris.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/07/Annex-4.6.-Workstream-1-Obstacles-and-Solutions-in-the-implementation-of-
the-FD-2008909JHA.pdf (accessed 12 March 2019). 
37
 European Commission, Report on the implementation by the Member States of Framework Decisions 
2008/909/JHA, 2008/947/JHA and 2009/829/JHA, COM(2014) 57 final, cit., p. 7. 
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of the main features and implications of this instrument among the categories involved. 
This situation eventually impacts the prisoners, who usually provide a blind and vague 
opinion on the possibility of serving their sentence abroad. In fact, the analysis of the 
case files demonstrates that the prisoner's opinion is merely represented by a tick in a 
box, without any in-depth clarification or statement of reasons. In this respect, following 
the practice of other Member States, the Italian Ministry of Justice is about to publish a 
booklet, which will be made available to all EU detainees. This document will provide 
all necessary information regarding cross-border transfers and other judicial cooperation 
procedures, along with general explanations of the rules governing the criminal 
execution phase in some Member States and the contacts with key diplomatic, 
governmental and judicial authorities. 
On the other hand, the prison administration adopts an unselective approach to this 
initiative and often submits to either the Ministry of Justice or the competent 
prosecution office all the forms it collects, regardless of their content and the opinion 
expressed therein. This attitude reflects the original governmental priorities on the use 
of cross-border transfers and leads to several shortcomings. It has rapidly led to an 
increasing backlog of procedures, many of which have come to nothing, because of the 
limited period of detention still to be served or the excessive length of the procedure. 
This approach triggers purely stalling behaviours from the authorities involved, which 
are de facto encouraged to focus on those procedures showing greater potential for an 
actual transfer. Some pending transfers are left in limbo by Italian prosecution offices, 
especially in cases of short-term sentences. Furthermore, the executing authorities quite 
often rely on the possibility provided by the Framework Decision to consult the issuing 
authority for additional details and clarifications, thereby slowing down the mechanism. 
A second important element refers to the lack of instruments available to the judicial 
authorities for assessing the chances of social rehabilitation. Their scrutiny is usually 
based on generic and not carefully verified assumptions, from which the knowledge of 
the language of the host State and the presence of family links play a paramount role. 
The analysis of the case files has shown that underestimation of the prisoner's situation 
is a recurring feature, to the detriment of the individualisation of punishment, which 
should be a key premise for a successful path of social rehabilitation. 
To some extent, this is explained by the survey and the interviews, as many judicial 
authorities point out that they lack adequate tools and resources (ranging from time to 
the actual availability of evidence) either to support the prisoner's statements or to better 
understand his/her economic, social and family context. In particular, they complain that 
they can only perform a negative assessment, which means that they can only ascertain 
the absence of grounds for filing a transfer request. 
At the same time, the Framework Decision provides for opportunities of exchange of 
information between the issuing and executing judicial authorities, which could address 
this concern. However, the backlog and the centralisation of the procedure in the hands 
of the Ministry of Justice makes it materially difficult to carry out (rapidly) such an ex 
ante in-depth analysis and to coordinate the efforts of the authorities involved.
38
 This 
also applies, as a final point, to the exchange of information on the prison facility of 
                                                          
38
 For instance, during the interviews and the high profile mutual learning groups, the Spanish authorities 
put forward that they usually try to identify some possible factors facilitating the establishment of the 
prisoner's centre of gravity, often by means of EU databases and operation cooperation contacts with 
foreign police forces. Aside from the identification of family links, key examples are searches for 
registered movable and immovable properties and other (previous) economic assets and activities. 
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destination of the person concerned and to the legal regime the prisoner will be subject 
to. In fact, the inmate is usually entirely unaware of the real implications of a transfer. 
 
 
4.2. Mutual trust is not blind trust: Cross-border transfers, systemic deficiencies and the 
serious risk of violation of fundamental rights. 
Another recurring concern related to the implementation of Framework Decision 
2008/909/JHA at national level refers to the fact that the domestic authorities often treat 
this procedure as a separate continent in the globe of judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters. It follows that the remarkable advances made in the context of other EU 
secondary law instruments are seldom extended to cross-border transfers, especially as 
regards the standards of protection of fundamental rights. 
The clearest example concerns the scope of the European Arrest Warrant and the 
protection of the person to be surrendered from violations of his/her core rights in the 
issuing State. As is well known, the Court of Justice addressed this issue in its seminal 
judgments Aranyosi and Căldăraru and Celmer.39 In the first case, the Court elaborated 
on opinion 2/13 and NS,
40
 to confirm that mutual trust is not blind trust,
41
 as the duty to 
recognise and execute a foreign judgment cannot justify an overruling of fundamental 
rights.
42
 
More specifically,
43
 executing judicial authorities must take into due consideration the 
presence of reliable and up to date evidence demonstrating a structural deficiency of the 
penitentiary system of the State of execution, amounting to a widespread and real risk of 
a violation of the prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment enshrined in Art. 4 of 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. If such a systemic flaw is detected, the 
executing judicial authority must make a second, more specific and individualised 
assessment, as it has a duty to verify whether the person concerned would personally 
face such a risk of violation upon surrender to the requesting State. If so, the authority 
involved should request reassurances on the compatibility of the penitentiary regime 
and of the personal situation that the person concerned will face in the event of 
surrender with fundamental rights standards. 
Be that as it may, the body of information collected and the lack of or inadequacy of 
reassurances compel the judicial authority involved to postpone the execution of the 
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 ECJ, C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU, Aranyosi and Căldăraru; ECJ, C-216/18 PPU, LM (deficiencies in 
the system of justice), also known as Celmer.  
40
 ECJ, opinion 2/13, Accession of the European Union to the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, par. 191; ECJ, C-411/13 and C-493/10, NS and Others, par. 
78-80 and par. 94. For a commentary see K. Lenaerts, 'The principle of mutual recognition in the Area of 
freedom, security and justice', Il diritto dell’Unione europea 20 (2015), p. 525. The spillover effect from 
NS and the Dublin system to judicial cooperation in criminal matters had been envisaged by some 
commentators: F. Billing, 'The parallel between non-removal of asylum seekers and non-execution of a 
European arrest warrant on human rights grounds: the CJEU case of N.S. v. Secretary of State for the 
Home Department', European Criminal Law Review 2 (2012), pp. 77-91; V. Mitsilegas, 'The Limits of 
Mutual Trust in Europe’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: From Automatic Inter-State Cooperation 
to the Slow Emergence of the Individual, Yearbook of European Law 31 (2012), pp. 319-72. 
41
 K. Lenaerts, 'La vie après l’avis: Exploring the principle of mutual (yet not blind) trust', Common 
Market Law Review 54 (2017), pp. 805-840. 
42
 S. Montaldo, 'On a Collision Course! Mutual Recognition. Mutual Trust and the Protection of 
Fundamental Rights in the Recent Case Law of the Court of Justice', in European Papers 2 (2016), p. 
984. 
43
 The test is explained in Aranyosi and Căldăraru, para. 88-104. 
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European Arrest Warrant and, in the end, if the situation does not improve and no 
alternatives are identified, to abandon it.
44
 In its subsequent case law, the Court of 
Justice has further clarified the scope of this individualised assessment.
45
 Firstly, 
provided that a systemic deficiency exists, the mere availability of a judicial remedy to 
challenge the conditions of detention does not rule out the real risk of inhuman and 
degrading treatment.
46
 Secondly, the executing judicial authority is required to assess 
only the conditions of detention in prisons in which, according to the available 
information, it is likely that that person will be detained, including on a temporary or 
transitional basis.
47
 Moreover, this evaluation must be confined to the actual and precise 
detention conditions which are relevant for determining a breach of the Charter in the 
specific case at issue, for instance in light of the physical and mental situation of the 
inmate.
48
 
Building on this background, the Celmer case offered the Court of Justice the 
opportunity to expand the scope of this two-layered test to the (serious risk of a) plain 
violation of a pillar of the rule of law, namely the independence and impartiality of the 
judiciary in the issuing Member State, ultimately affecting the right to a fair trial 
enshrined in Art. 47(2) of the Charter. 
On that occasion, the Court was confronted with the recent reforms of the Polish 
judiciary and reiterated mutatis mutandis the subsequent and intertwined phases of this 
assessment. Firstly, as far as the identification of a systemic deficiency is concerned, it 
acknowledged that the executing authority can be satisfied with the issue of a reasoned 
proposal of the European Commission adopted pursuant to Art. 7(1) TEU, detecting a 
real risk of breach of the right to a fair trial, on account of structural or generalised flaws 
with regard to the independence of the judiciary. Secondly, it stated that the executing 
authority must determine, specifically and precisely, whether the situation of the person 
concerned, the nature of the offence for which he/she is being prosecuted and the factual 
context that form the basis of the European Arrest Warrant converge to demonstrate that 
there are substantial grounds for believing that that person will run the outlined serious 
risk. 
The question is therefore if and how the scope of the Aranyosi and Căldăraru test can 
apply to cross-border transfers of prisoners.
49
 This extension is at first sight limited by 
the inherent difference between the two cooperation procedures under consideration. In 
fact, the mechanism set by Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA reverses the roles of the 
                                                          
44
 For a commentary on the various steps of the test and on the possibility of extending it to other human 
rights violations, see, inter alia, S. Gáspár-Szilágy, 'Joined cases Aranyosi and Căldăraru. Converging 
human rights standards, mutual trust and new grounds for postponing a European Arrest Warrant', 
European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 24 (2016), p. 197-219. 
45
 ECJ, C-220/18 PPU, LM (detention conditions in Hungary). 
46
 C-220/18 PPU, LM (detention conditions in Hungary), par. 74 and 75. 
47
 C-220/18 PPU, LM (detention conditions in Hungary), par. 84-87. Interestingly, the Court reaches this 
conclusion (also) on the basis of the need to respect the strict deadlines imposed by Framework Decision 
2002/584/JHA to execute an European Arrest Warrant and to avoid impunity accordingly.  
48
 C-220/18 PPU, LM (detention conditions in Hungary), par. 94. 
49
 This is a cross-sectional issue which also applies to other judicial cooperation instruments, in particular 
those which are described to be complementary to Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA, namely 
Framework Decision 2008/947/JHA and Framework Decision 2009/829/JHA. Some authors have already 
ruled out this possibility, but alternative tools - where not alternative approaches to the same test - should 
be sought, for the sake of the coherence of the judicial cooperation system in the EU. See T. Marguery, 
'La confiance mutuelle sous pression dans le cadre du transfert des personnes condamnées au sein de 
l'Union européenne', Eucrim 13 (2018), p. 185. 
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issuing and executing Member States. According to the definitions envisaged by Art. 1, 
the former notion is embodied by the sentencing State, while the latter refers to the 
Member State to which a judgment is forwarded for the purpose of its recognition and 
enforcement. 
This means that the issuing authority submits a request for cooperation and - upon 
recognition of its judgment - materially performs the transfer of the person concerned, 
whereas in the framework of the European Arrest Warrant the executing authority is 
tasked with the surrender. Conversely, Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA connects the 
notion of executing authority to the execution of the sentence in the Member State of 
transfer. 
It follows that the above outlined twofold test could hardly be reiterated as such in 
cross-border transfers. In fact, it would require the executing judicial authority to refuse 
recognition on the grounds of a negative self-assessment of the actual standard of 
protection of core fundamental rights in its own Member State. This means that the test 
would be in any event structurally modified, as it would be confined within the realm of 
the executing State and no cross-border exchange of information and provision of 
assurances would logically apply. Crucially, we would be faced with a profoundly 
different assessment, the rationale of which would not be the establishment of 
exceptional limits to mutual trust and mutual recognition among the Member States but, 
rather, the empowerment of the domestic constitutional struggle for ensuring the 
compatibility of the national legal order with the standards set by the Charter. There 
would also be inevitable constitutional implications at national level, in terms of checks 
and balances between the judiciary and the executive and legislative branches of a 
Member State
50
; the test would in any event undergo a genetic paradigm shift. It would 
be transformed from a horizontal inter-State dynamic of mutual warning on the 
protection of fundamental rights
51
 to a purely domestic and unilateral scrutiny over the 
suitability of the national legal framework to respect this qualified EU acquis and the 
primacy and effectiveness of Union law. 
Nonetheless, from a substantive point of view, the judicial authority in the Member 
State where the sentence will be enforced could not obliterate the duty to protect 
fundamental rights when implementing EU law, set forth by Art. 51(1) of the Charter. In 
line with this, Art. 3(4) of the Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA replicates the 
wording of many other EU acts implementing the principle of mutual recognition in 
criminal matters, insofar as it recalls that this mechanism "does not have the effect of 
modifying the obligation to respect fundamental rights and fundamental legal principles 
as enshrined in Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union". This clause is identical to 
Art. 1(3) of the Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA, which the Court of Justice has 
used as a legal basis to establish the Aranyosi and Căldăraru test.52 
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 From this point of view, it would be to a certain extent materially difficult to perform, as the executing 
judicial authority would self-acknowledge the existence of widespread challenges to fundamental rights 
within its own jurisdiction. Even though this would be precisely the role that one would expect to be 
played by an independent judicial scrutiny over the risk of abuses on the part of the public authorities, it 
must not be taken for granted that in concreto any judicial authority would be ready and fully equipped to 
take on such a responsibility. 
51
 I. Canor, ‘My brother’s keeper? Horizontal Solange: An Ever Closer Distrust Among the Peoples of 
Europe’, Common Market Law Review 52 (2013) p. 383-421. 
52
 Moreover, both Framework Decisions do not envisage a general ground for refusal of recognition 
related to the violation of fundamental rights standards. This is due to a legislative choice which has been 
reconsidered in recent normative practice in the domain of judicial cooperation in criminal matters. In 
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From this point of view, the focus on exceptional and systemic flaws and the evidentiary 
threshold proposed by the Court of Justice in its case law could be reliable reference 
points for this self-assessment, also due to the fact that any diverging and stricter 
constitutional requirement would have to be considered through the lens of the Melloni 
doctrine.
53
 This would also be in line with the urgent need for EU-wide coherence of the 
general approach to the limits on cross-border judicial cooperation mechanisms, 
irrespective of the solutions developed on an individual basis. 
In any event, looking at the cross-border transfer mechanism from a broader 
perspective, the actual feasibility of a (revised) Aranyosi and Căldăraru test would not 
be the sole remedy for fundamental rights concerns. Whereas the role of the executing 
judicial authority may suffer from additional constraints than occurs in the context of 
the European Arrest Warrant, it is still possible to rely on the authority involved in the 
issuing Member State.  
In this respect, Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA actually empowers the latter 
authority. Art. 4(2), provides that the issuing authority forwards the certificate only if it 
"is satisfied that the enforcement of the sentence by the executing State would serve the 
purpose of facilitating the social rehabilitation of the sentenced person". The wording of 
this provision is broad enough to encompass very different meanings and implications, 
ranging from the evaluation stricto sensu of the future chances of reinsertion into 
society to a technical assessment of the penitentiary system and legal framework in the 
Member State of execution. Be that as it may, this preliminary check should also include 
in-depth scrutiny at least with regard to the detention conditions that the transferee will 
face abroad. In fact, this information is highly relevant to achieving the objective of the 
Framework Decision, as the prison environment severely impacts the inmates' situation 
and inherently facilitates/hampers the path towards a successful reintegration process. 
This ex ante check may well fit also serious risks of further fundamental rights 
violations, such as the right to a fair trial and the right to personal freedom, which 
appear to be covered by the exceptional standard of the Aranyosi and Căldăraru test. 
In summary, Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA envisages tools for ensuring 
compliance with the Charter on a case-by-case basis, even though the above outlined 
scrutiny developed by the Court of Justice in the context of the European Arrest Warrant 
cannot be replicated as such for transfer procedures. In any event, judicial cooperation 
mechanisms must not lead to violations of fundamental rights; therefore, the issuing and 
executing authorities are expected to join efforts to avoid such an occurrence. In fact, 
the adoption of different standards of protection depending on the judicial cooperation 
mechanisms at stake would amount to an unacceptable systemic inconsistency, which 
                                                                                                                                                                          
fact, Directive 2014/41/EU on the European Investigation Order and Regulation 2018/1805 concerning 
the implementation of the principle of mutual recognition of freezing orders and confiscation orders do 
include such a clause as a mandatory ground for refusal of execution. See S. Montaldo, I limiti della 
cooperazione giudiziaria in materia penale nel'Unione europea (Naples: Editoriale Scientifica, 2015), p. 
380 et seq.  
53
 ECJ, C-399/11, Stefano Melloni v Ministerio Fiscal. For a commentary of the Court's approach to the 
relationship between national constitutional standards and the primacy and effectiveness of EU law see, 
inter alia, L. Besselink, 'The parameters of constitutional conflict after Melloni', European Law Review 
39 (2014), p. 531-52. 
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could hardly be hidden behind the prisoners' consent and the purpose of the Framework 
Decision.
54
 
In addition, this approach could address the current gap concerning the vast grey area of 
poor detention conditions which do not amount to an exceptional situation triggering the 
Aranyosi and Căldăraru test as such, but materially affect the right to liberty, in terms 
of disproportionate restrictions to Art. 6 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
EU.
55
 
Notwithstanding this, the gap between the European Arrest Warrant and transfer 
procedures is a recurring feature in daily practice. The analysis of the Italian scenario 
confirms that neither the judicial authorities involved - both as issuer and receiver - nor 
the Ministry of Justice takes these fundamental rights checks seriously when dealing 
with the transfer of a prisoner.
56
 No information is requested or provided concerning the 
detention facility to which the transferee will be sent and the conditions therein, 
including remarkable factors such as the possibility to follow social rehabilitation 
programmes while serving the sentence. This is even more paradoxical if one considers 
that this mechanism should facilitate the offender's social reinsertion, rather than 
avoiding impunity and ensuring the effective combating of crime, as it is for the 
European Arrest Warrant. 
 
 
4.3. Ognyanov II and the coordination of the domestic rules governing the enforcement 
of a sentence: Any room for distinguishing? 
A third and final structural concern regarding the implementation of transfer procedures 
refers to the interconnection of the penalty enforcement regimes of the Member States 
involved, particularly in relation to reduction and remission in sentence and penitentiary 
benefits in general. In fact, Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA covers the national 
'secret garden' of the criminal execution phase, which falls under the exclusive 
competence of the Member States and where the fragmentation of procedural and 
penitentiary regulatory frameworks reaches its peak. At the same time, the material 
transfer of a prisoner also draws a dividing line between the pre and post-transfer legal 
regime, which must be carefully addressed in order to maximise the chances of 
achieving the outlined social rehabilitation goal. It is no coincidence that the Court of 
Justice has been called to clarify the interconnection between these two converging 
poles and that similar problems have been raised before national courts. Therefore, the 
aim of this paragraph is to briefly present the stance taken by the Court of Justice in this 
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 This is also due to the fact that some of the rights under consideration - such as the prohibition of 
inhuman and degrading treatment - are deemed to be absolute ones by the Court of Justice and therefore 
cannot be restricted upon the concerned person's consent. 
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 For an argument on the link between (non-exceptionally) inadequate detention conditions, compliance 
with Art. 6 of the Charter and cross-border transfers see L. Mancano, 'Storming the Bastille: Detention 
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domain and to consider and discuss the gap between this case law and the reaction of 
the Italian courts, in particular the Supreme Court of Cassation. 
In this respect, in general terms, one of the basic assumptions of judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters across the Union is that the execution of a foreign decision is entrusted 
to the law of the State that has recognised it. The prominent role of the State of 
execution ensues from the principles of sovereignty and territoriality of criminal law. 
However, horizontal cooperation between the Member States requires balances and the 
issuing authority usually retains certain powers on either the conduct or the outcome of 
the cooperation mechanism. These range from light equivalence checks to more 
stringent controls over the activity of the executing authority. For instance, some 
Framework Decisions and Directives stipulate that specific aspects of the legal order of 
the country of origin must be respected even in the territory of the executing State.57 
From a reverse perspective, if the fragmentation of national legal orders blocks the 
execution of a foreign decision, the receiving authority will be endowed with the power 
to adjust that decision, in order to reconcile it with its legal order.58 Such adaptations 
mitigate the automaticity of judicial cooperation mechanisms and may incisively 
modify the nature and consequences of the decision concerned. Therefore, they are 
usually made conditional upon strict requirements, out of which the consent of the 
issuing State plays a paramount role and amounts to a right of veto.  
The more varied the domestic legal scenario, the more complex the coordination 
between the Member States involved and specific rules on the distribution of 
competences between the issuing and the executing authorities are required.  
At the time of the negotiations preceding the adoption of Framework Decision 
2008/909/JHA, the comparative analysis of the relevant national laws highlighted a 
considerable variety of means for enforcing sentences and of alternatives to 
imprisonment.
59
 The level of minimum and maximum penalties, prison regimes and 
prison conditions also revealed major differences. Therefore, the wording of this act was 
directly influenced by the need to avoid structural conflicts and to build mutual trust in 
(almost) unexplored areas of criminal procedural law.  
On these grounds, on the one hand, Art. 17(1) of the Framework Decision endows the 
executing authority with the primary and sole responsibility for governing the 
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enforcement of the sentence issued abroad. On the other hand, para. 3 of the same 
Article grants the issuing authority discretion as to the outcomes of the cooperation 
mechanism, particularly with regard to the forwarding of the certificate and to its 
withdrawal. Firstly, regardless of the above recalled concerns on the actual scope of the 
transfer procedures, the said authority must be satisfied that enforcing the sentence 
abroad will enhance the prisoner's chances of social rehabilitation, to the extent that it is 
entitled to have the last and decisive word. Secondly, Art. 17(2), urges the executing 
authority to deduct the deprivation of liberty already served in another Member State 
from the total duration of the sentence. In fact, it is more than likely that the 
enforcement has already commenced in the issuing Member State before the judicial 
cooperation mechanism is completed, or even prior to the very first steps of the 
procedure in the issuing State itself. 
It follows that, in comparison to other similar instruments, the Framework Decision 
attempts to empower the issuing authority, particularly with regard to the reciprocal 
consistency and continuity of enforcement of the sentence in the Member States 
involved, as a way of avoiding abrupt interruptions of the ongoing path towards social 
rehabilitation. In fact, a cross-border transfer represents a crucial step for the person 
concerned and carries significant risks with it. In principle, effective coordination 
between the domestic authorities can minimise these risks and preserve - if not amplify 
- the re-socialising essence of criminal punishment. 
At the same time, however, as recalled above, Art. 17(1) is clear-cut in describing the 
execution phases in the issuing and the executing States as separate events. The Court of 
Justice has taken over the wording of this provision to uphold a strict interpretation of 
the system governed by the Framework Decision. In Ognyanov II,60 the key question 
raised to the Court was whether the deduction required in order to quantify the post-
transfer remaining period of detention should include the (inevitably substantive) 
assessment of both the enforcement regime of the issuing Member State and the facts 
occurring during the first phase of enforcement. The Court of Justice considered that the 
Framework Decision wards off any overlap of competences: the cross-border 
enforcement of a sentence is the outcome of the separate but complementary efforts of 
the authorities involved.61  
It follows that, in the Court's view, the notion of enforcement under Art. 17 refers only 
to imprisonment - id est enforcement of the sentence - in the executing State and to the 
related legal regime.62 As a consequence, in the event of a more lenient regime in the 
executing State, any more favourable provision cannot operate retroactively. Instead, the 
scope of application of said measure is strictly limited to enforcement within the 
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territory of that State of destination, as all remissions in sentence connected to the pre-
transfer enforcement are to be considered solely by the issuing authority.
63
  
Territoriality and the automaticity of mutual recognition are in principle preserved, but 
the thick line drawn between the complementary sides of the cross-border enforcement 
of the same sentence has raised criticism on the actual capability of the mechanism set 
by the Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA to achieve its own goals.
64
  
The Italian legal order has been faced with the question underlying the Ognyanov II 
case in the aftermath of the implementation of the Framework Decision at domestic 
level. The first approach followed by the Italian courts was particularly beneficial to the 
prisoner. In fact, in a case involving the possibility to apply the Italian rules on early 
release
65
 to the periods of detention served abroad prior to a transfer, the Court of 
Cassation responded in the affirmative.
66
 This stance was taken on grounds that 
enforcement of the punishment in Italy does not obliterate the steps towards 
rehabilitation made in another Member State by the sentenced person and that such a 
cross-border process of re-socialisation should be considered as a unicum in its entirety. 
This extensive interpretation of the Framework Decision and the national law of 
transposition was soon absorbed by the lower courts, particularly those of criminal 
supervision ("tribunali di sorveglianza").  
However, the stricter view adopted by the Court of Justice in late 2016 again livened up 
the debate on this issue and urged a reconsideration of the well-established practice of 
the domestic authorities. The first - and by now the sole - reaction to Ognyanov II was 
another judgment from the Court of Cassation, issued in late December 2017.
67
 On that 
occasion, the Supreme Court acknowledged the clarifications provided by the Court of 
Justice, but made an effort to keep their implications to a minimum at domestic level. In 
fact, the domestic Court resorted to the technique of distinguishing, by stressing that the 
Ognyanov II preliminary ruling regarded a very peculiar case, the scope of which was 
confined by the specific factual circumstances at issue. In that case, at the request of the 
executing State, the issuing authorities had clearly stated that no reduction in sentence 
was envisaged by the Danish legal order in relation to working activities performed in 
prison by the detainee. Therefore, the Bulgarian authorities could not grant such a 
benefit retroactively, in plain contrast with the legal order of the issuing State. 
According to the Court of Cassation, the case in question concerned a different 
situation, where the Italian authorities had not consulted the issuing ones in relation to 
the scope and implications of the relevant rules governing enforcement in their legal 
order. Moreover, while Ognyanov II focused on the regime of reduction in sentence, the 
situation faced by the Supreme Court concerned the benefit of early release. As already 
recalled, the reduction in sentence could have been granted on account of work carried 
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out by the sentenced person while in detention, whereas the Italian legal order makes 
the early release conditional upon a record of good conduct in prison. 
These arguments are quite surprising, as they provide very little substance to the attempt 
to distinguish the case at hand from the Court of Justice's approach in Ognyanov II. In 
fact, neither the lack of previous contacts between the authorities involved as regards 
the coordination between the enforcement phases in the issuing and the executing 
Member States, nor the different penitentiary benefits at stake seems to justify a plain 
departure from the case law of the Court of Justice and the wording of Art. 17 of the 
Framework Decision. To a certain extent, the extensive interpretation developed by the 
Italian Court of Cassation addresses the scholarly concerns on the actual coherence of 
Ognyanov II with the objectives of the Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA. However, it 
does so by means of completely unconvincing and formalistic arguments, which do not 
tackle the limited interpretative flexibility left by Art. 17 and the need to avoid undue 
mutual interferences between the Member States involved. In addition, no role has been 
conferred at all to offenders' rehabilitation as a primary objective capable of orienting 
the interpretation of the Framework Decision and its laws of implementation towards 
the empowerment of the individual and its progressive path to re-socialisation. 
In conclusion, by considering that the Italian rules on early release could apply 
retroactively in relation to the phase of enforcement served abroad, the Court of 
Cassation has frustrated the scope of Ognyanov II. In addition, the criminal supervision 
courts at territorial level have soon relied upon this approach, thereby amplifying the 
gap with the stance taken by the Court of Justice. 
This leads to the consideration that the interpretation of Art. 17 of Framework Decision 
2008/909/JHA urged by the Luxembourg case law is deprived of substance in Italy, to 
the detriment of the structural features of the procedure for cross-border transfers set out 
by Union legislature, particularly with regards to the coordination of the national rules 
governing the enforcement of a sentence.  
 
 
5. Concluding Remarks: The Sliding Doors of Mutual Trust 
 
Although basically centred on the Italian experience, this article provides evidence of an 
interesting development in the implementation of Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA. 
It appears that this instrument is entering a new phase of its cycle, at least in some 
Member States. Following years of widespread silence and (quantitative) limited 
practice, cross-border transfers are now increasingly finding their place in the practice 
of domestic judicial authorities, even though they represent a small piece in the much 
more complex puzzle of judicial cooperation instruments.
68
 
Therefore, the time has come for a more attentive analysis of the procedural and 
substantive hurdles hampering the full effectiveness of Framework Decision 
2008/909/JHA and the achievement of its objective. In fact, the study on the Italian 
scenario has revealed some inconsistencies between the expected patterns of 
implementation at the EU level and the need to adapt the functioning of the mechanism 
to the priorities pursued in the national realm. The governmental will to prioritise the 
deflation of prison overcrowding and the subsequent focus on the bilateral relationship 
with Romania have shaped the Italian approach to cross-border transfers accordingly. 
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The study carried out so far in the context of the RePers project highlights that legal 
fragmentation in the field of criminal punishment enforcement raises serious practical 
challenges to mutual trust. To some extent, mutual trust is deemed to be inherently and 
necessarily connected to the achievement of a prior and adequate level of awareness of 
those foreign rules and practices which matter most in a given case. Admittedly, this 
raises structural concerns on the actual grip of mutual recognition mechanisms as they 
are in principle designed, since it reveals the perception that divergences between 
national legislations hamper judicial cooperation. This phenomenon takes two opposing 
directions. 
On the one hand, legal fragmentation urges national authorities to find a way out of the 
vacuum of uniformed trust. The memorandum of understanding between Italy and 
Romania is an illustrative example of the creeping uneasiness with the law in the books 
of mutual trust and unveils the daily procedural obstacles to the full effectiveness of 
cross-border transfers. Beyond statement of principles, especially in sensitive areas such 
as criminal law enforcement, mutual trust needs de facto to be built, by means of shared 
solutions and agreed practices. To some extent, a misconceived attitude towards mutual 
confidence also triggers unilateral approaches towards the coordination of domestic 
enforcement regimes, as we have seen in the context of the interpretation of Art. 17 of 
the Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA in Italy. The acknowledgement of the 
retroactive and extraterritorial scope of the national rules on penitentiary benefits 
amounts to a disguised unwillingness to accept foreign legal regimes, their implications 
on criminal punishment and their underlying rationale. If not properly confined and 
corrected, especially due to its authoritative domestic source, this peculiar version of 
mutual (mis)trust could easily expand to an undefined set of issues and instruments of 
judicial cooperation, thereby hampering its very foundations. 
On the other hand, mutual trust strikes back when it comes to key elements of judicial 
cooperation mechanisms, such as their limits. When compared to the system of the 
European Arrest Warrant, the current absence of a prior positive fundamental rights 
assessment as a precondition for a cross-border transfer further exacerbates the 
incoherence of the national approach to mutual confidence and raises serious structural 
challenges to the European criminal space. This is even more striking due to the 
frequent overlap of the scope of Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA and Framework 
Decision 2008/909/JHA. In this respect, despite the purely technical nature of the 
mechanisms established at EU level, it appears that the will of the national central 
governmental authorities is still capable of orienting the practice of the judicial 
authorities, through their coordination tasks. 
